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RISKY BUSINESS: THE CREDIT CRISIS AND 
FAILURE (PART III) 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa* 
I. CONSUMERS, INDUSTRY, AND REGULATORY COSTS  
Collection and effective analysis of financial market data may help 
prevent future crises.  The high human costs of market crises, which may 
significantly affect those least well positioned to bear such costs,1 make 
prevention of future crises a high priority.  This is particularly true in light 
of the pervasive financial market networks that characterize contemporary 
financial markets.  Further, through their influence on financial variables 
such as interest rates and currency prices, financial market networks reach 
deep into the homes and pocketbooks of a significant portion of the world‘s 
population.2  The fallout from the subprime mortgage market collapse thus 
illustrates fundamental ways in which financial market participants and the 
broader global community are linked. 
A. Costs of Ineffective Regulation 
Individuals and businesses bear costs in connection with regulatory and 
industry failures that lead to market crisis.  First, although federal financial 
regulators ―are largely self-supporting through fee collections, assessments, 
or other funding sources,‖3 individuals in their roles as consumers, taxpay-
ers, workers, and investors pay the costs for ineffective yet costly U.S. 
regulatory frameworks,4 including significant levels of business financing 
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be significantly less than the estimated $700 billion authorized under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),6 taxpayers bear much of the cost of 
financial industry bailouts.7  Third, taxpayers may suffer significant delete-
rious consequences from the impact of the credit crisis on the real economy, 
which is suggested by a broad range of economic data, such as unemploy-
ment and mortgage foreclosure statistics, personal bankruptcies, and more 
restricted access to credit.8  Although the costs for financial market players 
have been high, financial institutions‘ losses have been subsidized by the 
U.S. government, and ultimately borne to some extent by U.S. taxpayers.9  
Losses and costs from the credit crisis, including credit losses, U.S. stock 
market losses, lost production and costs associated with declining gross 
domestic product, have likely reached the trillions.10 
Given the enormous costs imposed by the credit crisis, regulatory 
reform efforts need strengthening, and reformers must fundamentally re-
think the U.S. regulatory architecture.  If the credit crisis does not lead to a 
fundamental redesign of U.S. financial market regulation, it is not clear 
what level of financial market catastrophe would be required to do so.  With 
the exception of the Treasury Blueprint optimal regulatory structure, none 
of the existing reform proposals come close to fundamental redesign, which 
is troubling given the profound costs imposed by the credit crisis and inef-
fective yet costly U.S. regulatory frameworks.  Further, ineffective regula-
tion is doubly costly, because it may lull market participants, including 
investors, consumers, and professional market actors into thinking that the 
government is actually monitoring risk. 
                                                                                                                           
WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 29–30 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf (noting 
that although federal bank regulation is self-funded, SEC collections are deposited with the U.S. Trea-
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  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 2 n.6 
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thority for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was originally set at a maximum of $700 billion 
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are difficult to quantify) (link). 
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  Meredith Whitney, The Credit Crunch Continues, WSJ.COM, Oct. 1, 2009, 
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―taxpayer dollars have supported ‗too big to fail‘ businesses‖) (link). 
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  COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1011. 
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B. Financial Literacy and Risk Penalties: Creating Incentives for Better 
Risk Management and Disclosure  
In the absence of fundamental regulatory redesign, other useful actions 
might help better align internal industry and regulatory incentives, such as 
intensifying penalties for behaviors that create systemic risk, creating 
broader mechanisms for financial literacy and education about risk at all le-
vels of activity, and developing better risk disclosure practices for market 
participants. 
1. Meaningful Penalties:  Sliding Scale Incentive Regulation  
In addition to ensuring that private market discipline rests on incen-
tives that encourage market participants to properly price risk, regulatory 
penalties should be reconsidered in light of existing incentives.  Auction 
Rate Securities (ARS) markets illustrate the impact of incentives for finan-
cial market participants.  ARS, which were first issued in 1984, are ―long-
term, variable-rate instruments that have their interest rates reset at periodic 
and frequent auctions.‖11  The ARS market, which collapsed in February 
2008, seemingly offered benefits to both issuers and investors.12  ARS 
enabled issuers to vary their credit spread over time by issuing long-term 
variable-rate debt without establishing either a fixed interest rate or a varia-
ble benchmark and credit spread for the life of the instrument at the time of 
issuance, as would be the case with traditional fixed-rate or variable-rate in-
struments.13  ARS were the subject of a 2006 SEC settlement in which firms 
settled for $13 million, without admitting or denying SEC charges.14  This 
settlement is negligible when compared to the amount of money that banks 
made from underwriting and managing ARS auctions.  Given the revenue 
flows from the $330 billion that the ARS market reached before its col-





  STEPHANIE LEE, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, AUCTION-RATE SECURITIES: BIDDER‘S 
REMORSE? 1 (2008), http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_Auction_Rate_Securities_0708.pdf (describing 
ARS securities) (link). 
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  Id.  
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effective interest rate would vary over the life of the variable interest rate debt instrument, the method of 
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issuance. 
14
  Press Release, SEC, Fifteen Broker-Dealer Firms Settle SEC Charges Involving Violative Prac-
tices in the Auction Rate Securities Market (May 31, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-
83.htm (link); Order Instituting Administrative Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Securities Act Release 
No. 8,684 (May 31, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8684.pdf (link). 
15
  LEE, supra note 11, at 2. 
104:441 (2010)    The Credit Crisis and Failure: Part III 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/16/ 444 
basis points for each auction,16 it is likely that banks gained far in excess of 
the $13 million SEC settlement.  For example, if the $330 billion in sales 
occurred in a single year, with auctions of all outstanding ARS taking place 
monthly, bank revenues from ARS underwriting fees in that year alone 
could exceed $3 billion.17  
Given the monetary incentives that existed in the ARS market, the 
2006 settlement likely constituted a minor slap on the wrist.  The ARS set-
tlement occurred during a time of declining penalty collections by the 
SEC.18  In contrast, sliding scale penalties might provide a better mechan-
ism for aligning incentives in some instances.  Sliding scale regulation has 
been applied in the context of regulated industries such as telecommunica-
tions.19  In the financial market context, sliding scale penalties could be 
conceptualized as forced profit or revenue-sharing, with payments into a 
fund established by regulators for certain first or continuing regulatory vi-
olations.  Assuming that the amount of the profit or revenue-sharing could 
be set at an appropriate level, the prospect of such profit or revenue penal-
ties would likely facilitate internal firm risk management and shareholder 
monitoring to avoid the penalties.  In the ARS case, even a penalty of as 
low as 10% of profits accrued for using the practices that led to the SEC 
charges, or some percentage of firm profits during the periods in which vi-
olations occurred, might have had a greater impact on future behavior.  
Recognition of the importance of meaningful penalties was a factor in 
Judge Rakoff‘s 2009 rejection of an SEC settlement with Bank of America 
in relation to its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, which reflects judicial con-
cern about the nature, fairness, and amount of SEC settlements.20  Judge 
Rakoff described the proposed settlement as ―neither fair, nor reasonable, 





  See LEE, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that the underwriter typically receives a fee of 25 basis 
points); Administrative Complaint at 37-38, In the Matter of UBS Securities, Inc., No. 2008-0045 
(Mass. Sec. Div. June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctubs2/ubs2_complaint.pdf 
(stating that UBS‘ underwriting fee is typically 1%) (link). 
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  For example, 1% of $330 billion would garner $3.3 billion in annual underwriting fees. 
18
  U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-358, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE 
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 68 (2009), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/05/gaoreportsec.pdf (noting declining levels of SEC penalties in the period pre-
ceding the credit crisis, with penalties becoming more like disgorgement) (link). 
19
  Donald J. Kridel, David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, The Effects of Incentive Regula-
tion in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey, 9 J. REG. ECON. 269, 290–293 (1996) (finding in-
creasing productivity under incentive regulation schemes in the telecommunications industry); see 
generally Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: Some Lessons, 9 J. REG. ECON. 211, 221 (1996) (noting that different structures of incen-
tive regulation can yield different outcomes); Thomas P. Lyon, A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation, 9 
J. REG. ECON. 227, 228 (1996) (giving an efficiency rationale for sliding scale regulation). 
20
  SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (mem. order). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/16/ 445 
ty for a false statement that materially infected a multi-billion dollar mer-
ger.‖21 
2. Risk Education and Financial Literacy 
The credit crisis also demonstrates a significant need for better finan-
cial education with respect to risk, both for sophisticated market partici-
pants and regulators who need a more comprehensive understanding of 
complex financial products, trading strategies, and networks.  Financial 
market regulation that is based on an assumption of private market discip-
line implicitly assumes that market participants have sufficient knowledge 
and education to enable them to effectuate the discipline that is part of the 
foundation on which market regulation rests.  Although education can be a 
blunt tool, a pervasive lack of knowledge by multiple parties was no doubt 
a factor in the crisis.  For example, the ARS market was developed by bro-
ker-dealers who were willfully ignorant about the products they sold.  In-
terviews by Massachusetts officials of ARS financial advisors revealed 
knowledge based only on conversations with other advisors and mere anec-
dotal understanding of the products they were selling, much of which was 
incorrect.22  In many instances, ARS customers, including sophisticated 
purchasers such as Pulitzer Prize-winning financial writer James Stewart, 
lacked knowledge about the risks of what they were buying.23 
In addition to better professional education for market participants and 
regulators, greater consideration should be given to ways to make retail in-
vestor education more comprehensive and interactive.  A televised public 
service announcement series that focuses on investment and financial mar-
ket basics might assist retail investors in understanding financial market 
products and investment best practices.  Further, current methods for de-
termining retail investor qualifications may also be inadequate.  In addition 
to the financial thresholds that exist for individual investors under Regula-





  Id. at 512. 
22
  Administrative Complaint at 2529, In the Matter of UBS Securities, Inc., No. 2008-0045 (Mass. 
Sec. Div. June 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctubs2/ubs2_complaint.pdf (not-
ing lack of training and understanding about ARS by UBS financial advisors that sold ARS) (link). 
23
  See James B. Stewart, Risks of a ‘Safe’ Investment Are Found Out the Hard Way, WSJ.COM, Feb. 
27, 2008, http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB120406650371394765.html (link). 
24
  Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2009/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr230.501.pdf (defining an accredited individual 
investor to include banks and savings institutions as well as persons with an individual or joint net worth 
in excess of $1 million or person with an individual income in excess of $200,000 or joint income in 
excess of $300,000 in the two most recent years with a reasonable expectation of the same level of in-
come in the current year) (link).  The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 Senate bill 
would significantly change the operation of Regulation D and permit the SEC to disqualify certain Reg-
ulation D offerings.  See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
§ 926 (2010), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ChairmansMark31510AYO10306_xmlFinancialReformLegislati
onBill.pdf (link). 
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vestor tests as a key aspect of private market discipline.  True assessment of 
investor qualifications should go beyond the check-the-box approach of 
some investor qualification questionnaires.  For example, this could involve 
developing interactive investor knowledge tests (IKTs), which could be 
geared to the specific nature of varied investment opportunities.  The pur-
pose of such tests would not be to require a particular score from a prospec-
tive investor alone or together with the investor‘s representative, but to help 
ensure that potential investors and financial service providers are forced to 
focus on the types of financial instruments, trading strategies, and risks as-
sociated with potential investment opportunities.25  Such IKTs could be 
used for their informational value (rather than their raw score) to help in-
crease investors‘ awareness about what they should know, or at least inves-
tigate, prior to participating in a particular investment.  A hedge fund, for 
example, could have a stated level of preferred IKT score for a particular 
investment opportunity.  Investors below that level could participate, but 
they and hedge fund managers would be on notice that they might not un-
derstand the risks of the investment opportunity.  IKTs could facilitate bet-
ter incorporation of risk into decision-making by clarifying the nature of 
knowledge that might be desired for participation in particular investment 
opportunities. 
Better risk education is an important factor in enhancing risk manage-
ment.  Some of the lack of attention to risk that led to the credit crisis is a 
consequence of incentive structures within the financial services industry.  
However, better risk education might encourage retail investors, sophisti-
cated market participants, and regulators to more closely question transac-
tions and investment opportunities, such as the Madoff Ponzi scheme, that 
seemingly offered a riskless premium return.26 
3.  Interactive Disclosure 
In addition to regulatory penalty reform and greater focus on educa-
tion, changes could also be made that promote greater disclosure surround-
ing financial markets, financial products, and risk.  Regulated entity 
disclosure requirements should be supplemented to require additional dis-





  See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND 
MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED 
ATTENTION IS NEEDED 29 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08200.pdf (noting that ―[t]he ability 
of market discipline to control hedge funds‘ risk is limited by some investors‘ inability to understand 
and evaluate the information they receive . . . ‖) (link). 
26
  See Kara Scannell, SEC Had Chances for Years to Expose Madoff’s Alleged Ponzi Scheme, 
WSJ.COM Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB122928886040304911.html?mod=articleoutset-box (―The revelations 
are the latest blow to the reputation of an agency that has been criticized for insufficient enforcement 
and the failure to better monitor the dangerous risk-taking on Wall Street that triggered this year‘s finan-
cial crisis.‖) (link). 
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tion S-K,27 which contains many of the specific disclosure requirements to 
which reporting companies are subject, reflects a largely top-down perspec-
tive that focuses on aggregate risks to the reporting entity, which may not 
adequately aggregate risks embedded in networks of connectivity that may 
reach down to the level of individual traders.28  Mandatory disclosure about 
risk should be supplemented to include more bottom-up perspectives, in-
cluding discussion of company risk management policies and training, as 
well as the specific ways in which all employee compensation, not just that 
of senior executives, aligns with the potential risks that employees may un-
dertake.  Such disclosure is particularly important for all employees that di-
rectly engage in capital market trading activities. 
C. Revolving Doors and Consequences for Failure 
In the final analysis, the credit crisis should provide lessons about the 
importance of appropriately addressing failure.  Consumers have felt the 
consequences of the credit crisis.  They were encouraged to invest in hous-
ing by government policies on interest rates and home-buying incentive 
programs.29  Creative industry packaging of mortgages, some of which were 
―built to self-destruct,‖30 occurred alongside what some have characterized 
as significant declines in loan documentation standards and increases in 
subprime mortgage originations.31  Prior to the credit crisis, a wide range of 
homeowners, not just subprime borrowers, engaged in risky behavior that 
essentially took a directional bet on the continued increase of housing pric-
es.  Some borrowers had insufficient incentive to avoid high-risk mortgage 





  Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2009), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_09/17cfr229_09.html (link). 
28
  See id. at § 229.305, available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2009/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr229.305.pdf (―In preparing the foreign currency 
value at risk disclosures, this registrant should report the aggregate potential loss from hypothetical 
changes in both the DM/ FF exchange rate exposure and the FF/$US exchange rate exposure.‖) (link). 
29
  See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 23, 
2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html (―Mr. Greenspan‘s critics 
say that he encouraged the bubble in housing prices by keeping interest rates too low for too long and 
that he failed to rein in the explosive growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending.‖) (link); Jo 
Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, 
NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 20, 2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/12/21/business/21admin.html (―‗This 
administration made decisions that allowed the free market to operate as a barroom brawl instead of a 
prize fight,‘ said L. William Seidman, who advised Republican presidents and led the savings and loan 
bailout in the 1990s. ‗To make the market work well, you have to have a lot of rules.‘‖) (link). 
30
  Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO.COM, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/ (link). 
31
  Id. 
32
  Martin Feldstein, How to Help People Whose Home Values Are Underwater, WSJ.COM., Nov. 
18, 2008, http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB122697004441035727.html (link).  Various government pol-
icies further encouraged consumer leveraging trends.  The Bush administration initiated a program to 
encourage home ownership that permitted home purchases with no money down.  Tax policies, includ-
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consumers have been punished, in many instances far beyond the scope of 
any risk-taking activities they might have undertaken.33  Although consum-
ers in the U.S. do have the option of walking away from their mortgages, 
doing so is financially costly and likely to negatively impact their credit.34 
In contrast to failures by consumers, failures by industry participants 
and regulators occur in an environment of revolving doors, where failure 
may be rewarded with a better position.35  Revolving doors enable industry 
participants to move from current failures to future prospects.  For example, 
being involved in the failure of a hedge fund has not limited future career 
options in a number of high-profile cases.36  Although some firms such as 
Lehman Brothers were permitted to fail, many financial services institutions 
whose activities would otherwise have led to firm failure were saved by 
government intervention.37  Even though the systemic failure rationales for 
                                                                                                                           
ing the deductibility of home mortgage interest payments and tax exemption for capital gains from home 
sales adopted in 1997 during the Clinton administration, further encouraged consumers to purchase 
homes.  See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax Break May Have Helped Cause Housing Bubble, 
NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.NYTimes.com/2008/12/19/business/19tax.html (link).  The 
Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan maintained low interest rates that many assert led to a housing 
bubble.  Id.; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009. 
33
  See Clyde Ashley & Krystal D. Wilson, The Credit Crunch and the Impact on the US Economy 
and Global Markets: How Damaging Will It Be? 16 Proceedings OF AMER. SOC. BUSINESSES & 
BEHAVIORAL SCIS. 35 (2009), http://www.asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/A/AshleyC2.pdf (describing nega-
tive impact of credit crisis on consumers, including increasing mortgage defaults and foreclosures, 
which has put downward pressure on housing prices and decreasing levels of available credit) (link); 
Simon Johnson, Can the Federal Reserve Protect Consumers?, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, Aug. 13, 
2009, http://economix.blogs.NYTIMES.COM/2009/08/13/can-the-federal-reserve-protect-consumers/ 
(―More broadly, the former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan famously stood by despite being warned by 
his colleagues about the housing bubble and the associated abuses of consumers.  As the housing frenzy 
developed in 2003 and low-income people got sucked in and—many of them—suckered, Mr. Bernanke 
argued for a further lowering of interest rates on the basis of short-run macroeconomic considerations; 
apparently he was oblivious to the dangers that implied to consumer-as-borrowers.‖) (link). 
34
  Nick Timiraos, Some Buy a New Home to Bail on the Old, WSJ.COM., June 11, 2008, 
http://online.WSJ.com/article/SB121314811278463077.html (―To be sure, walking away from a mort-
gage, even if legal, has plenty of drawbacks: Borrowers lose the ability to take out unsecured loans, 
since foreclosures can stay on a credit report for seven years.  In some states, lenders can sue for assets, 
including a new house.‖) (link). 
35
  Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as We Know It, NYTimes. 
com, Jan. 3, 2009, http://www.NYTimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhorn.html (describing the 
SEC as ―plagued by wacky incentives‖ based on prospect of future employment on Wall Street) (link). 
36
  See Frank Partnoy, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 182183 (2003) (noting that Kidder Peabody trader Joseph Jett, whose trades generated $350 
million in losses for Kidder Peabody, was acquitted of securities fraud, avoided damages from civil law-
suits and revived his career, becoming chief investment officer of a multi-million dollar offshore in-
vestment fund) (link); James M. Clash, Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello with Josephine Lee, The 
$500 Billion Hedge Fund Folly, FORBES.COM, Aug. 6, 2001, 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/08/06/070.html (noting that Michael Berger, Joseph Jett and John Meri-
wether of Long-Term Capital all found opportunities after their initial hedge funds failed) (link). 
37
  OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3348 (2010), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/April2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf (giving 
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such rescues may be cogent and reasoned, preventing firms from failing 
poses a significant problem for the future.  Institutions that cannot fail are 
likely to continue to take outsized risks that generate significant private 
profits on the upside and large public losses on the downside.  Failures by 
individual industry participants and firms may thus not be sufficiently pena-
lized. 
Although industry failures have and should be highlighted, greater at-
tention also needs to be paid to government failures.  Prevention of future 
crises will greatly depend on the extent to which both government and in-
dustry participants can be held accountable for failure.38  Although greater 
industry expertise and additional resources are needed at the SEC,39 the re-
volving door between the SEC and Wall Street may have contributed to 
SEC regulatory failures.40  Similarly, SEC staff supervision of the Madoff 
investigation may have been more concerned about damaging future career 
prospects than giving teeth to the SEC investigation.41  Concerns about fu-
ture career opportunities may also have been a factor in the SEC failure to 
pursue action against Ponzi operator Allen Stanford.  The head of Enforce-
ment in the SEC‘s Forth Worth, Texas office did not undertake an enforce-
ment action against Stanford—despite repeated examinations by SEC staff 
                                                                                                                           
overview of TARP programs and status of firms receiving TARP funds as of March 31. 2010) (link); see 
also BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40438.pdf (describing the ―essential failure‖ of AIG) (link); OFFICE 
OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, INITIAL REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS 4190 (2009), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/SIGTARP_Initial_Report_to_the_Congress.pdf (listing 
recipients of bailout funds, which include financial services firms such as J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America, as well as AIG, General Motors, and Chrysler) 
(link); Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITYFAIR.COM, Aug. 2008, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/bear_stearns200808 (describing the near failure of 
Bear Stearns) (link). 
38
  Congress, for example, bears few consequences for legislation that produces failed and frag-
mented regulatory frameworks.  Ironically, fear of failure at the SEC may have been a factor in the fail-
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Martens, Madoff and the SEC’s Revolving Door, Counterpunch.org, Aug. 31, 2009, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/martens08312009.html (link). 
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that strongly suggested that Stanford was running a Ponzi scheme, later 
sought to represent Stanford, and for a short period actually did so.42  One 
recent empirical study suggests that biases in enforcement may reflect sys-
tematic SEC under-enforcement against large firms.43  This may be the 
product of regulatory capture, a potential risk with any regulatory frame-
work.  Regulatory principles that emphasize transparency may be one ap-
proach for dealing with regulatory capture.  In 2007, the Senate Committees 
on Finance and the Judiciary conducted a joint investigation of the SEC 
over ―allegations of lax enforcement, improper political influence, [and] 
whistleblower retaliation.‖44  This investigation was a response to negative 
publicity following the SEC termination of an employee involved in a 
hedge fund investigation, in which assertions were made about improper 
political influence in SEC enforcement investigations.45  The joint congres-
sional investigation also drew attention to the revolving door between the 
SEC and Wall Street that some assert improperly influences SEC investiga-
tions.46 
Steps should be taken to prevent and reduce the extent to which revolv-
ing doors may intensify the likelihood of government or industry failure.  A 
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tial counsel to represent him.‖) (link). 
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2009, http://www.NYTimes.com/2009/06/27/business/27nocera.html?pagewanted=1 (link); Stavros Ga-
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vard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717 (―Instead, any bias towards big firms is 
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bans, mandatory time lags on future employment, or clear firewalls or re-
cusal policies with respect to prior employment.48  Congressman Barney 
Frank‘s response to a staffer who went to work for a financial services in-
dustry lobbyist may be an approach to consider.49  When a top staffer of the 
House Financial Services Committee went to work as a lobbyist for the 
owner of the largest credit default swap houses, Congressman Frank banned 
committee staff from talking to the former staffer about financial regulation 
or financial matters until Frank no longer chairs the Committee.50  In the 
end, such steps may be one important way to address the widespread indus-
try and regulator shortcomings that led to the credit crisis. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The credit crisis is a watershed event that illustrates much about both 
the importance and limits of regulation.  It demonstrates, for example, how 
national regulatory frameworks may be ineffective in increasingly globa-
lized financial markets.  The credit crisis underscores the need for regulato-
ry reform that creates frameworks that fit the contexts of their application.  
Regulation also needs to address the persistent problem of failure and how 
to ensure that existing incentives do not reward failure by either regulators 
or industry participants.  Regulation is also increasingly a factor in global 
competitiveness, as well as a mechanism that can instill confidence in fi-
nancial market integrity.  Confidence is a huge factor in the financial ser-
vices industry.51  In addition to causing significant market volatility and 
instability, market crises may deleteriously impact market confidence.  In 
an industry where physical assets are few and intangible assets are para-
mount, a failure in confidence may also cause financial markets to freeze.  
A crisis of confidence can be difficult to overcome. 
Market crises often test confidence and may even trigger regulatory 
reactions that toughen the application of existing legal frameworks or lead 
to the adoption of new ones in response to a particular market crisis.  The 
current market crisis unfolded in arenas with significant existing regulation.  
Existing reform legislation fails to take sufficient account of the implica-
tions of regulatory failures that contributed to the credit crisis.  On May 20, 
2010, the U.S. Senate passed the financial reform bill sponsored by Senator 
Chris Dodd.52  Although this new legislation purports to address the under-
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lying problems that led to the credit crisis, as has been the case historically 
in the United States, it targets the causes of the last crisis rather than achiev-
ing overarching reform of vulnerabilities and other problems in financial 
market regulatory frameworks more generally.53  More fundamental regula-
tory reforms are needed to address potential future market crises.  Reactions 
to the current crisis should thus be initiated at the same time as an overall 
assessment of existing regulation prior to the adoption of any new regulato-
ry requirements.  Existing regulatory frameworks should be evaluated and 
new regulations adopted taking into account specific regulatory principles.  
Further, regulatory reforms in response to the current crisis should be 
shaped by acknowledgment of a fundamental shift in the nature of trading 
activities and financial market networks.  Changing technology has shaped 
trading activities in a broad range of entities, both regulated and unregu-
lated.  The incentives that govern traders and other market participants in 
such trading contexts should be key considerations in proposed regulatory 
reforms.  Such incentives can play a significant role in determining the ex-
tent to which financial market networks embody speculative risk-taking 
trading activities or reflect more cautious approaches to risk that truly in-
corporate private market discipline and minimize the potential for systemic 
market instability, network failure, and industry and government failure. 
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